



abstract. One of the key features of modern mathematics is
the adoption of the abstract method. Our goal in this paper is to
propose an explication of that method that is rooted in the history
of the subject.
1 Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to sketch a theory of mathematical ab-
straction as it appeared in 20th century mathematics. Indeed, mathematics
in the 20th century is marked by what is called the abstract approach. To
wit:
One of the amazing features of twentieth century mathematics
has been its recognition of the power of the abstract approach.
This has given rise to a large body of new results and problems
and has, in fact, led us to open up whole new areas of mathe-
matics whose existence had not even been suspected. (Herstein,
1975, 1)
This quote is taken from the opening page of a standard textbook in abstract
algebra. I would not say, however, that one of the amazing features of
modern mathematics is the “recognition” of its power. For that suggests
that the abstract approach existed before the twentieth century and that
mathematicians then came to realize how powerful the approach is. In fact,
the abstract approach was created in the late 19th and early 20th centuries
and it was developed in the 20th century. The recognition of its power came
along with its development.
1I gratefully acknowledge the funding received from the SSHRC. I want to thank the
organizers for inviting to present this work at the CLMPS 2011. The paper was written
in its present form while I was visiting the University Paris-Diderot. I want to thank
Jean-Jacques Szczeciniarz and the University Paris-Diderot for their hospitality.
P. Schroeder-Heister, W. Hodges, G. Heinzmann and P. E. Bour (eds.), Logic, Method-
ology and Philosophy of Science. Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Congress
(Nancy), 1–24. © 2014.
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Together with its power, Herstein emphasizes the capacity of the abstract
approach to bring to existence whole new areas of mathematics. As is well
known, the face of mathematics changed radically during the 20th century,
largely because of the abstract approach. The existence of these new areas
of mathematics goes hand in hand with the power of the approach. Were
these new areas not powerful—no matter how one understands that latter
notion—, they would not be taken to refer to genuinely new mathematical
objects.
If we were to ask mathematicians what is the abstract approach, they
would probably point to obvious examples. Herstein, for one, would simply
invite us to study his textbook: after a brief introduction to set theory,
mappings and the integers, follow chapters on group theory, ring theory,
vector spaces and modules, fields and linear transformations. These are
all familiar topics in contemporary mathematics. But why are they part
of the abstract approach? My goal in this paper is to elucidate what it is
for a mathematical theory to be considered abstract and how this feature
contributes to the approach that turned out to be and still is so powerful.
Along the way, we should be able to clarify what this power amounts to in
conceptual terms.
Given that there is in contemporary philosophy of mathematics a large
literature surrounding the nature of abstract entities, let me state explicitly
what I am not doing in this paper.
First, I am not entering the ontological debate. What I have to say
bears no relationship with contemporary discussions surrounding abstract
entities or the abstract/concrete distinction, e.g., that abstract entities are
causally inert or lack any spatio-temporal coordinates, etc. (For a general
discussion of the issues involved in this debate, in particular issues related
to the nominalism/platonism debate, see for instance (Burgess & Rosen,
1997).) The whole discussion I am about to launch unfolds entirely within
the realm of abstract entities, no matter how these are defined. It is my
profound belief that abstraction in mathematics is solely an epistemological
issue and that the abstract character of mathematics is not an ontological
property but rather derives from epistemological features of mathematical
knowledge itself. I am not so much concerned with abstract objects than
with the process of abstraction and the abstract method. Some mathemat-
ical objects, or rather mathematical concepts, are abstracted. They do not
inherit a dubious ontological status for that reason. Mathematicians also
talk about concrete mathematical entities and, by the latter, they don’t
mean an abacus or a compass.
This text attempts a different approach, letting the abstract
concepts emerge gradually from less abstract problems about
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geometry, polynomials, numbers, etc. This is how the subject
evolved historically. This is how all good mathematics evolves—
abstraction and generalization is forced upon us as we attempt to
understand the “concrete” and the particular. (Solomon, 2003,
3)
Thus, I am after a specific process that we find (mostly but not exclusively)
in mathematics and that plays a key role in the development of contempo-
rary mathematics.
Second, even though I have pushed aside the ontological issues involved,
it is undeniable that abstraction is a multifaceted and polysemous concept.
Abstraction has a long history, it is basically as old as Western philosophy
itself. On the contemporary scene, it comes in various flavours and textures.
It is sometimes analysed as being psychological in nature, at other times, as
being purely logical and at other times, as being epistemological. It is also
central in the teaching of higher mathematics.1 My hope is to unearth what
seems to me to be key features of mathematical abstraction as it actually
developed in the 20th century.2
Third, I am focussing here on abstraction and the abstract method in
the practice of mathematics and not in the foundations of mathematics or
in its logical analysis. I am not merely claiming that the abstract character
of modern mathematics emerged as a by-product from the usage of the
axiomatic method within formal systems and that it is the formal aspect
of language which is responsible of the abstract character of mathematics.
That approach would equate being abstract with being formal, the latter
term referring to formal languages. In other words, I will not identify being
abstract with what can be studied apart from any particular interpretation.
This is certainly one possible and plausible interpretation of the abstract
nature of modern mathematics and, in fact, there is a grain of truth in that
picture, as I will try to show. Although it contains a part of the analysis, it
fails to include some important parts, in particular the inherent dynamics
and recursive aspect of the abstraction process in modern mathematics.
1For the historical aspects, see (Cleary, 1995; Walmsley, 2000; Jesseph, 1993), for the
psychological aspects, see, for instance (Piaget, 1977; Barsalou, 2003, 2005; Houde´, 2009),
for the logical components, see (Lorenzen, 1965; Fine, 2002; Tennant, 2004; Antonelli,
2010), for some epistemological and logical components, see (Weyl, 1949; Pollard, 1987;
Arbib, 1990; Simon, 1990; Ferrari, 2003) and, finally, for pedagogical reflexions on the
subject, see (Piaget, 1977; Dubinsky, 1991; Frorer et al., 1997; Hazzan, 1999; Mitchelmore
& White, 2004).
2I recommend Sinaceur’s interesting discussion of the various facets of mathematical
abstraction (see Sinaceur, 2014). Unfortunately, time constraints did not allow me to
incorporate elements of her analysis in my present work.
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In a nutshell, in the practice of mathematics, the abstract method pro-
gressively became a method with many different functions: it was used to
solve problems, to introduce new concepts and organizing principles, and
even to install norms of construction. Furthermore, the method is such that
it works in a recursive fashion. I believe that the abstract nature of modern
mathematics is better captured by a faithful description of the process of
abstraction inherent to the actual historical development of modern math-
ematics and not merely by the description of axiomatic systems (together
with their underlying logic). The latter are a result of the former.
2 Very brief historical remarks
I have to limit myself to sketchy and impressionistic remarks in this pa-
per. For, the history is complex and convoluted. The roots of the abstract
method certainly go back to the end of the 18th century with Euler, La-
grange and others, and the beginning of the 19th century with Gauss, Galois,
Abel, Dirichlet, Riemann, Dedekind, etc. My aim is not to unearth these
roots, but merely bring to the fore certain elements that were inherent to the
genesis of the abstract approach. We fortunately have some serious stud-
ies that allow us to have a good grasp of the main historical components
involved.3
It seems reasonably safe to claim that the abstract approach made its
official and general appearance in 1930, in a famous and extremely influen-
tial book, namely Van der Waerden Moderne Algera. Here is the opening
sentence:
The “abstract,” “formal,” or “axiomatic” direction, to which
the fresh impetus in algebra is due, has led to a number of
new formulations of ideas, insight into new interrelations, and
far-reaching results, especially in group theory, field theory, val-
uation theory, ideal theory, and the theory of hypercomplex num-
bers. (van der Waerden, 1991, ix)
The first three words of the book are, to my mind at least, striking:
“abstract”, “formal”, or “axiomatic”. Notice the “or”; it is not an “and”.
It is as if van der Waerden considered them to be almost synonyms and
perhaps, since they are in quotes, not quite clear. I do believe, however,
that he was quite clear about the fact that the axiomatic direction was
taking a new orientation, breaking away from its traditional philosophical
3See, for instance, (Bernkopf, 1966; Browder, 1975; Dieudonne´, 1981; Birkhoff &
Kreyszig, 1984; Wussing, 1984; Kleiner, 1996, 1999a,b; Corry, 1996; Smithies, 1997;
Corry, 2000; Epple, 2003; Corry, 2007; Dorier, 1995, 2000; Gray & Parshall, 2007; Moore,
1995, 2007).
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status. The identification between the abstract, formal and axiomatic was
common in the 1930s and it remains so to this day. I will give only one
quote, but it would be easy to multiply them:
It is abstraction—more than anything else—that characterizes
the mathematics of the twentieth century. There is both power
and elegance in the axiomatic method, attributes that can and
should be appreciated by students early in their mathematical
careers and even if they happen to be confronting contemporary
abstract mathematics in a serious way for the very first time.
(Watkins, 2007, ix)
When van der Waerden wrote his book, he did not make a clear distinction
between the formal, the abstract and the axiomatic. They all came to-
gether, fused and converged into one general method which was considered
new and powerful. It is easy to show that the formal, and the axiomatic are
not necessarily tied to the abstract method. In fact, the abstract method
does not necessarily rely on the formal and the axiomatic methods. But
historically, the formal and the axiomatic methods were combined in a cer-
tain manner by mathematicians and it became modern mathematics. Once
this combination was found and shown to be elegant and powerful, it trans-
formed the way mathematics was done and progressively led to a second
wave of abstraction that came in the 1950s and 1960s and that is still going
on today, once again transforming mathematics profoundly.
It is well-known that the first discipline to appear as an abstract theory
was group theory. It will be enough for me to underline but one element in
this historical process.
The mathematical literature of the nineteenth century, and es-
pecially the work of decisive importance for the evolution of the
abstract group concept written at the century’s end, make it
abundantly clear that that development had three equally im-
portant historical roots, namely, the theory of algebraic equa-
tions, number theory, and geometry. Abstract group theory was
the result of a gradual process of abstraction from implicit and
explicit group-theoretic methods and concepts involving the in-
teraction of its three historical roots. I stress that my inclusion
of number theory and geometry among the sources of causal ten-
dencies for the development of abstract group theory is grounded
in the historical record and is not the result of a backward pro-
jection of modern group theoretic thought. (Wussing, 1984, 16)
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This is an interesting and surprising empirical fact: three equally important
domains had to be available for the abstraction to take place. It seems to
be a minimum, at least at this early stage. When only two are available,
mathematicians will rather consider an analogy or a generalization, not an
abstraction. One telling example of this is the work of Dedekind and Weber
on algebraic numbers and algebraic functions (see Corfield, 2003, chap. 4).
This appears to be an important cognitive component of the story. In
fact, even for the whole field of algebra, it seems that three different and
equally important theories had to be available for the community to consider
that algebra as a whole could go in the direction of the abstract method.
However, I should stress that it might not be necessary, it might simply
reflect a cognitive trait in some individuals or communities.
Her [i.e., Noether] work had a greater overall impact on algebra
than Steinitz’s, if only due to the fact that, having appeared
about ten years later, it showed that Steinitz’s program applied
not only for the particular case worked out by him, but for many
other significant cases as well. Group theory was thus the first
algebraic discipline to be abstractly investigated, and field the-
ory the first discipline that arose from the research of numerical
domain into an abstract, structural subject. The study of ideal
theory in an abstract ring consolidated the idea that a more gen-
eral conception lay behind all this: the conception that algebra
should be concerned, as a discipline, with the study of algebraic
structures. (Corry, 1996, 251)
Corry here suggests that after three examples, mathematicians tend to gen-
eralize. I would say that, in this particular case, they were ready to abstract.
Be that as it may, from the algebraic side, we have the development of group
theory, field theory and ring theory, the latter accompanied by ideal theory
and module theory. There were developments on the geometric side that
were also important. Thus, metric spaces appeared early on the scene in the
work of Fre´chet, who was soon followed by Hausdorff on topological spaces
and Banach on Banach spaces. The history of vector spaces is more convo-
luted but certainly belongs here. Finally, two theories that have a somewhat
different path but that certainly belong to the picture, if only because they
bring in different components to it, the theory of Boolean algebras and lat-
tice theory. It is also worth mentioning at this point that Bourbaki consid-
ered that there were three mother structures: order structures, topological
structures and algebraic structures. Underlying this abstract method, one
finds, of course, set theory and, to a certain extent, logic. In the second
wave of abstraction, the most important and salient example of the use of
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the abstract method is certainly the categorical foundations of algebraic
geometry provided by Grothendieck and his school in the 1960s. The other
striking example along these lines is Quillen’s work in homotopical algebra
which can be seen as the bedrock of abstract homotopy theory.
Let us come back to the formal and the axiomatic methods and their role
in the rise of the abstract method. Historically, both a formal standpoint
and the axiomatic method were available. I claim that both were diverted
from their original purposes and became key components of the abstract
method, to the extent that the latter was more or less identified with them,
as we have seen. Let us consider them briefly in turn.
2.1 Symbolic formalism and algebra
Algebra is customarily associated with the manipulation of signs, letters,
that are used to represent quantities and are manipulated according to
given, explicit rules. Nowadays, we take for granted various symbolic con-
ventions and rules of manipulation associated with various calculus. Need-
less to say, the introduction of these symbolisms has itself an intricate and
philosophically important history.4 One driving analogy emerged towards
the end of the 18th century between rules of manipulations of arithmetic
and rules of manipulations of differentials and operations in general. It goes
back at least to Lagrange and was developed by Lacroix, Arbogast, Brisson,
Franais, Servois on the French side, and using the work by the French as a
springboard, by Woodhouse, Babbage, Peacock, Gregory, Boole, DeMorgan
on the English side. It became known as symbolic algebra or the calculus
of operations. But the key element is that it became a formal method.
Symbolic algebra represented a movement away from algebra
as universal arithmetic to a purely formal algebra. It empha-
sized the importance of structure over meaning, and acknowl-
edged what has been called the principle of mathematical free-
dom. This principle implies that algebra deals with arbitrary,
meaningless symbols, mathematicians create the rules regarding
the manipulation of those symbols, and the interpretation fol-
lows rather than precedes the algebraic manipulation. (Allaire
& Bradley, 2002, 403)
It has been argued that this view goes back in the philosophical literature
at least to Berkeley.5 One striking expression of this view is found in the
British algebraist Peacock:6
4See, for instance, (Serfati, 2002, 2005).
5See, for instance, (Detlefsen, 2005).
6The view clearly goes back to Woodhouse as early as 1803. But it seems that his
book had almost no impact, apart from the fact that Babbage apparently learned a lot
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Algebra may be considered, in its most general form, as the
science which treats of the combinations of arbitrary signs and
symbols by means of defined through arbitrary laws: for we may
assume any laws for the combination and incorporation of such
symbols, so long as our assumptions are independent, and there-
fore not inconsistent with each other... (Peacock, 1830, 71, § 78)
It is easy to multiply the quotes of the so-called Cambridge algebraists.
I will restrain myself to two:7
... symbolical algebra is... the science which treats of the com-
bination of operations defined not by their nature,... but by the
laws of combination to which they are subject... [W]e suppose
the existence of classes of unknown operations subject to the
same laws. (Gregory, 1840, 210) quoted by (Allaire & Bradley,
2002, 404)
And in Boole:
They who are acquainted with the present state of the theory of
Symbolic Algebra, are aware, that the validity of the processes of
analysis does not depend upon the interpretation of the symbols
which are employed, but solely upon the laws of their combina-
tion. (Boole, 1847, 3) quoted by (Allaire & Bradley, 2002, 400)
These sound extraordinarily modern to our ears. However, we have to be
very careful not to read our conception of algebra, in particular abstract
algebra in them, for it is definitely not. To mention but one clear case,
Peacock would not include in algebra a non-commutative system, since it
differs as such from arithmetic.8
For our purposes, it is sufficient to underline one aspect of the theory:
it is seen as a general method, not as an abstract method. As Allaire &
Bradley puts it “What can be proved for a class generally, holds for all
specific operations in that class” (Allaire & Bradley, 2002, 407). But, I
hasten to add, a (limited but genuine) form of abstraction appeared in the
from it. It should also be noted that Peacock was one of his students (see Koppelman,
1971).
7For more, see, for instance, (Koppelman, 1971; Allaire & Bradley, 2002).
8I should add that, in this respect, I disagree with the view proposed by Koppelman,
who claims that the work done by the English algebraists fostered “an abstract view and
clearly influencing many of the men who were to give, in the 1840’s the beginnings of an
abstract definition of algebra” (Koppelman, 1971, 188). I would say that they developed
a formal view of algebra and not an abstract view. I hope the next sections will allow
the reader to see why I would make this nuanced claim.
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writings of some mathematicians of that period. Here is one of the most
striking passage under the pen of the French mathematician Servois:
Along the way, other links between the differential, the differ-
ence, variation and numbers emerged; it was necessary to find
its cause, and everything is fortunately explained, when after
having stripped, by a severe abstraction, these functions of their
specific qualities, one only has to consider the two properties
they have in common, being distributive and commutative be-
tween them. Servois, quoted by (Koppelman, 1971, 175) (my
translation)
However, this seems to be the exception rather than the norm. The em-
phasis, at that time, was rather on the analogy underlying operations and
numbers.
Many developments in mathematics in the 19th century contributed to
the emergence of various shades of formalism: projective geometry, non-
euclidean geometry, complex numbers, quaternions, octonions and hyper-
complex numbers and, of course, the theory of invariants. One of the legacies
of the 18th century was the status of negative numbers! In each case, there
were problems attributing sense and reference to the symbols manipulated
or, in the case of invariants, particularly in the so-called algorithmic school
of Paul Gordan, there were series of manipulations that were used in or-
der to obtain results which could not be justified except as pure rules of
computations.9
It is therefore not hard to find both in the view or image and in the
body of algebra the formal component explicitly mentioned.10 Thus, in two
important works by Weber we find a clear and undeniable endorsement of
symbolic formalism. First, in his book on Galois theory, one reads:
In the following an attempt is made to present Galois theory of
algebraic equations in a way which include equally well all cases
in which this theory might by used. Thus we present it here
as a direct consequence of the group concept illuminated by the
field concept, as a formal structure completely without reference
to any numerical interpretation of the elements used. (Weber,
1893, 521) quoted by (Corry, 1996, 36) (my emphasis)
We find a similar claim in the abridged edition of his famous textbook on
algebra:
9See, for instance, (McLarty, 2011).
10The distinction between the image of a discipline and its body comes from (Corry,
1996), who attributes it to (Elkana, 1981).
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In analysis one is accustomed to understand a “variable” as a
sign which takes successively different values. Algebra uses the
word variable as well but in a different sense. Here it is a mere
calculating symbol [Rechnungssymbole] with which one operates
by the rules of calculating with letters [Buchstabenrechnung ].
(Weber, 1912, 47), quoted by (McLarty, 2011, 105)
What is the point? As the foregoing quotes show, towards the end of
the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century, it was becoming possible
to divorce symbols and their rules from a specific, fixed content, a definite
meaning. Algebra was, in some of its areas, considered to be formal. Notice
that I did not say abstract, for I claim that this is different. By 1910, field
theory and group theory were already considered to be abstract and for
good reasons. But the abstract method was not quite in place yet.
2.2 The axiomatic method and the abstract method
Mathematicians talk about the axiomatic method and the abstract method
as if they were interchangeable. Of course, this is simply false. The ax-
iomatic method as nothing to do per se with the abstract method. Suffice
it to mention Euclidean geometry, the paradigmatic example of an axiomatic
theory. Euclidean geometry is certainly not considered to be an example of
the abstract method.
The main point to make here is that, historically, the axiomatic method
was the only known mode of presentation that could perform the function
required by the abstract method: to provide a clear statement of a set of
properties chosen in the process of abstraction.11 It is well-known that this
was not the main nor the only function of the axiomatic method in the late
19th and early 20th centuries. Nowadays, other modes of presentation can
be and are used, e.g., the graphical language of sketches in categorical logic.
3 Mathematical Abstraction and the abstract
method: putting the pieces together
What I am going to describe constitutes, it seems to me, the main route to
the abstract method. It should be kept in mind that all four components
have to be present for the process to be a full process of abstraction. The
order is not crucial.
First, there is a domain of distinct types of entities, at least three distinct
types of entities, which becomes a domain of variation within which there
are nonetheless invariant features. It is crucial that the three domains be
considered to be sufficiently different, that the domain of variation be a
11For more on the axiomatic method in 20th century mathematics, see Schlimm (2013).
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domain of significant variation. This interplay of variation and invariance
opens the door to the possibility of abstracting.
Second, for the invariant features to be abstracted, one has to take a
formal stance with respect to the individual objects of the various domains.
In other words, one has to forget what one is talking about, the meaning of
the signs involved and treat them purely formally. Thus, the abstract and
the formal are sometimes confused.
Third, the invariant features are abstracted and, at this stage, one needs
a method to present these features and be able to investigate them in an au-
tonomous fashion. It is at this moment that the axiomatic method appears
to be exactly what one needs. The axioms capture the invariant features
and one then uses logic to investigate what can be known from them. Notice
that in some cases, the axioms might stipulate properties that are not obvi-
ously in the distinct domains as such. It is once the property is enunciated
in a language that one can, in some cases, convince oneself that, indeed, it
is a property of the entities given.
Fourth, a new criterion of identity for the abstracted entities has to be
discovered and fixed. In turn, fixing a criterion of identity is possible if and
only if linguistic resources are available for these properties and criteria of
identity to be expressed. The new criterion of identity is almost always
discovered after the abstract entities have been introduced, for a developed
theory has to be available in order to make sure that the criterion of identity
has the right properties. The invariant component is from then on circum-
scribed clearly and independently of the original entities. These are seen to
be instances of these new types and are studied as such, that is, there is a
shift of attention from the old criterion of identity and its associated prop-
erties to the new criterion and its associated properties. Almost always, it
is then possible to discover and construct new, unforeseen instances of these
new abstract entities. Thus, the domain of variation can expand and is never
fixed once and for all. In more philosophical terms, once the new types have
been fixed, known examples become tokens of the type and new, unforeseen
tokens can be constructed or discovered. However, very quickly the shift of
attention draws mathematicians towards intrinsic problems, or one might
say pure problems, of the new field, for instance, problems of classification
or decompositions into well-organized patterns will become central.
Let me underline immediately that arbitrary sets and functions between
them played a key part in the development of the abstract method, partic-
ularly in the fourth step. Once the focus shifts towards the abstract entities
themselves, one needs to talk of unspecified elements that are determined by
the properties stated by the axioms. Sets and functions introduced earlier
were perfect candidates for that role.
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3.1 Domain of significant variation
I now need to clarify what I mean by a domain of variation and a domain
of significant variation. The best way to introduce these ideas is by giving
an example.
One of the very first cases of an extraordinarily successful abstraction in
the history of modern mathematics is certainly that of metric spaces, intro-
duced by Fre´chet around 1906 in the context of functional analysis.12 What
I want to emphasize in this case is the range of the domain of variation and
the fact that it is a domain of significant variation. I think it is fair to say
that at that point, mathematicians did not think in terms of abstract sets in
the sense of a collection of faceless points. In the context of geometry, math-
ematicians were thinking of manifolds, either as subspaces of spaces of real
or complex points. In the case of Fre´chet, he was dealing with these usual
manifolds, namely R,R2, . . . ,Rn, . . . ,C,C2, . . . ,Cn together with functions
between them on the one hand, and infinite-dimensional functional spaces
together with operators between them on the other hand. In his thesis,
Fre´chet gives four examples of functional spaces that satisfy his axioms.
See (Fre´chet, 1906) or Taylor (1982). Here they are.
1. Let J be a closed interval of the real line R and consider the space RJ
of continuous functions f : J → R. A metric on RJ is defined by
d(f, g) = max(|f(x)− g(x)|) ∀x ∈ J.
2. Consider the space E∞ = RN of infinite sequences x = (x1, x2, . . . ) of







1 + |xn − yn| .
3. A space of parametrized curves in R3 with the standard Euclidean
metric between points. Using the latter, Fre´chet defines a metric
between the curves.
4. Finally, let A be a complex plane region whose boundary consists
of one or more contours. Let {An} be a sequence of bounded re-
gions such that An ⊂ int(An+1) and An ⊂ int(A) and such that
any given bounded region in the interior of A is in the interior of
12It is known that Fre´chet knew about the case of groups and that it provided at least
guidelines and a model of what could be achieved by moving up the ladder of abstraction.
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some An for n sufficiently large. Consider the space {f : int(A) →
C|f is holomorphic} and let
Mn(f, g) = max(|f(z)− g(z)|) when z is in the closure of An.







1 + Mn(f, g)
.
Although I haven’t described the third example in detail, what is striking
is how different they are from one another and, perhaps even more so, from
the spaces of points Rn and Cn. The main point is this: if we did not know
about the metric involved in each case, we might not think that these entities
have something in common. Indeed, we are accustomed to attribute certain
properties to real functions: continuity, differentiability, roots, maximum,
minimum, etc., we represent the graph of a function as a one-dimensional
path in the codomain, thus as something that necessarily has a length, we
think of a real function as a systematic relation of dependence between two
or more properties, as a quantity that varies according to a certain pattern
or whose variation depends on a another variation. A function is essentially
thought of as being dynamic. The four examples given by Fre´chet are of
this kind. A (real) point is, well, a point. It has none of the properties
of a function. Thus, the properties of the elements of R and even Rn are
incommensurable with the properties of the elements of a functional space.
I want to insist on the fact that given the properties of functions and given
that we think of functions with their properties, it is hard to conceive of a
space of functions, that is treating the latter as being points. It is as if we
were trying to think of the properties of functions and forget about them
at the same time. Of course, as soon as we have succeeded in thinking of
them as spaces, we stumble upon what is certainly seen as being the main
difference between these spaces and the usual spaces of points: the examples
given above are infinite dimensional. Thus, we also have two different types:
finite dimensional spaces on one side and infinite dimensional spaces on the
other.
We immediately see how the introduction of functional spaces increases
substantially the domain of variation. There is also a considerable amount
of variation between the four examples themselves. It is hard to see what
infinite sequences of real numbers might have in common with parametrized
curves in three dimensional Euclidean space, for instance. They seem to
belong to different categories of thought. It is only when they are thought
as being genuine spaces that we allow ourselves to attribute them similar
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properties. Here is how Fre´chet himself came to characterize the general
situation:
At first sight such an undertaking might be considered as absurd.
How can we speak of a geometry in a space whose “points” are
of an undefined nature, when we do not know if the elements are
numbers, curves, surfaces, functions, series, sets, etc.? (Fre´chet,
1951, 152)
By introducing an abstract level of analysis, one can specify the domain
of application of geometrical ideas. It is important to note that this range
might turn out to be much larger than anticipated. By considering all these
cases as being genuine spaces, one has at the same time a language and a
universe of interpretation for these terms in which it makes sense to consider
these seemingly different geometric entities as being nonetheless entities of
the same type. Notice that it is impossible at this stage to think of the
abstraction process in terms of an equivalence relation. One has to have the
properties that will be abstracted in order to define the criterion of identity
between the abstract entities. In other words, the criterion of identity can
not be given a priori but is derived from the theory. In fact, many of
the relevant properties of the spaces will only emerge while the theory is
constructed and developed.
The very same analysis can be given for group theory, field theory and
ring theory. I cannot present the details in such a short paper. I will merely
give pointers towards the relevant features in each case. Describing the
domain of variation and seeing how significant that variation is turns out to
be rather easy. It is important to keep in mind that, at this stage, what I
want to underline is not what these domains have in common, that is that
they are groups or fields or rings, but, on the contrary, how much they differ
at a very basic mathematical level.
As we have already seen in the foregoing quote about the genesis of group
theory, there had to be three different theories, the theory of algebraic
equations, number theory and geometry, for the abstract point of view to
emerge as such. These three domains, from the point of view of the practice,
when one consider the nature of the entities and their properties in each case,
are, in some sense, orthogonal. Algebra, number theory and geometry:
these were, in the 19th century, about different entities having different
properties and studied with different methods altogether. One would not
think of transferring properties of algebraic equations to numbers – how
many roots does it have? –, or properties of numbers to geometric figures
– is this triangle prime? Thus, once again, one has to systematically ignore
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most of what one has learned about these entities, how one ought to think
about these entities and their properties.
The case of fields is just as clear. Weber gave an axiomatic presentation
of the concept of field in 1893. However, in that paper, his goal was not to
develop field theory, rather he found it convenient to use the concept in his
presentation of Galois theory. But for the record, it is worth mentioning
that Weber includes in his examples algebraic numbers (number theory),
algebraic functions (algebraic geometry), Galois’s finite fields (algebra) and
Kronecker’s “congruence fields” K[x]/(p(x)), where K is a field and p(x) is
irreducible over K (algebra). Notice the variation already, but that is not
quite enough, for in these cases, one can rather think in terms of analogies
between the various domains. It is nowadays acknowledged that the abstract
theory of fields appeared on the scene with the publication of Steinitz’s
groundbreaking paper on the algebraic theory of fields in 1910. As Steinitz
himself explicitly acknowledges, it was Hensel’s p-adic numbers that sparked
his investigation.
I was led into this general research especially by Hensel’s Theory
of Algebraic Numbers, whose starting point is the field of p-adic
numbers, a field which counts neither as a field of functions nor
as a field of numbers in the usual sense of the word. Steinitz,
quoted by (Kleiner, 1999b, 861) (my emphasis)
One should show why the field of p-adic numbers introduces a significant
variation. I will unfortunately have to rely on Steinitz’s words in the context
of the present paper.
The history of abstract ring theory is convoluted and would deserve a
whole section in itself. We can set aside Fraenkel’s work on rings, since
although it constitute an important step towards the theory, it fails to do
so for interesting reasons that we simply cannot cover here. (But see Corry,
2000, for a nice analysis.) In a sense, one of the problems of ring the-
ory was precisely that the domain of variation was too wide and varied
for the construction of the theory. Two separate historical strands leading
to abstract ring theory have to be distinguished: commutative rings and
non-commutative rings. Commutative ring theory originates from algebraic
number theory, invariant theory and algebraic geometry and it is this strand
that led to Noether’s ground breaking work. Non-commutative ring theory
comes from the theory of hypercomplex number systems, nowadays called
finite dimensional algebras, and there are numerous different cases of these.
It would be necessary to focus our attention on Noether’s work, but we have
to leave this to another study. (See (Kleiner, 1996), (Swetz et al., 1995),
(Corry, 2000) and (McLarty, 2011) for instance.)
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These examples illustrate clearly what it is to start with a domain of sig-
nificant variation. In all cases, we have mathematical systems that have dif-
ferent, even incompatible properties, e.g., being finite/infinite dimensional,
being discrete/continuous, etc. I should point out that in these particular
examples, the systems considered are build from below so to speak, that is
from specific elements, their properties and operations on these elements or
relations between them. Once they are looked at from the abstract point
of view, these elements and their specific individual properties become to-
tally superfluous. Thus, what varies fundamentally, at this stage, is that
each element has, so to speak, a myriad of properties, a whole individual-
ity. In the process of abstraction, these specific individual properties are
almost all ignored in favor of properties that relate these individuals to-
gether, properties of parts and how they are related to one another and to
the whole. Finding the latter property is not a trivial matter and very often
new properties, relational properties, have to be found and emerge during
the abstraction process itself. Furthermore, these systems certainly cannot,
at first, be considered as being even possibly identical, not even as being
instances of a unique type with its criterion of identity, different from all
the specific criteria used for the individual systems. It is impossible to tell
that some of these systems might turn out to be identical when considered
as instances of a new type.
One last remark about a domain of variation is necessary. Axiom sys-
tems automatically yield a range of variation, at the syntactical level. But
it is seldom fruitful. It took a very long time and a considerable amount
of ingenuity before mathematicians considered it possible to obtain a sig-
nificant domain of variation from the axioms of Euclidean geometry. The
strategy here is simple: simply ignore some of the axioms and see whether
you get something interesting. But this strategy seldom yields genuinely
interesting results. One might simply get a more general framework that
does not perform any real work. However, as in the case of Euclidean ge-
ometry, what might be taken to be a sterile enterprise can reveal vast and
unforeseen possibilities. Hilbert’s axiomatization of Euclidean geometry is
a remarkable example of a successful, systematic, organization of a domain
that, at the same time, characterizes adequately specific domains and deals
with a domain of variation properly. There are other cases in algebra, e.g.,
monoids and groups or rings and commutative rings, but also in other fields,
e.g., generalized cohomology theories like K-theory, where deleting an ax-
iom still captures a rich domain of variation. The fact is, this method, if it
is a method at all, rarely yields interesting fruits: subtracting an axiom at
random does not necessarily provide a new, interesting theory. In all the
cases we have just mentioned, the domain of variation was already known
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when the axioms were set up and therefore one knew, in some sense, which
axioms could be removed fruitfully. As far as I know, removing an axiom in
the definition of a topological space does not yield any interesting geometric
system.13 The same is true for the notion of category (in contrast with the
notion of group) and probably many others as well.
4 The point of the abstract method
When Stephan Banach introduced the spaces that now bear his name, he
justified the use of the abstract method thusly:
The aim of the present work is to establish certain theorems valid
in different functional domains, which I specify in what follows.
Nevertheless, in order not to have to prove them for each partic-
ular domain, I have chosen to take a different route...; I consider
sets of elements about which I postulate certain properties; I
deduce from them certain theorems, and I then prove for each
particular functional domain that the postulates adopted are
true for it. Banach, quoted by (Moore, 1995, 280)
This is the strategy adopted by most mathematicians afterwards. The ab-
stract method leads to two different methodological levels: first, one proves
certain results for the abstract entities themselves, for the types so to speak,
and then one shows that domains of interest are tokens of these types and
therefore automatically satisfy the properties stated in the theorems proved.
However, this characterization fails to reveal the real import of the method
and why it is mathematically and philosophically so important. For, as such,
Banach’s claim merely says that the abstract approach is a form of general-
ization and a more economical method. This is indeed the case, but it does
not go at the heart of the method, its real strength or power. It should be
pointed out that by taking the abstract method, it is sometimes possible
to treat a domain of exotic or unusual entities as if they were known. For
instance, once p-adic numbers are seen as being a field and that it is pos-
sible to prove results about fields from pure field-theoretic properties, one
can dispense with trying to manipulate p-adic numbers, with some unusual
operations or properties. This is clearly one benefit of the method. But,
again, it is not the main force.
The abstract method is taken to yield a conceptual analysis of mathe-
matics: one talks one the group-concept, the ring-concept, the vector-space
13Of course, it might yield an interesting algebraic structure, e.g., an inf-lattice. It is
true that Hausdorff included the separability condition that now bears his name in his
first axiomatization and that removing it still yield a coherent and interesting geometric
notion, although some might still want to debate this last point.
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concept. Mathematics is then organized around these concepts which unify
in a deep way various domains of mathematics that were, and for good
reasons, believed to be unrelated.
In the wake of these developments has come not only a new
mathematics but a fresh outlook, and along with this, simple
new proofs of difficult classical results. The isolation of a prob-
lem into its basic essentials has often revealed for us the proper
setting, in the whole scheme of things, of results considered to
have been special and apart and has shown us interrelations
between areas previously thought to have been unconnected.
(Herstein, 1975, 1–2)
This is one of the main epistemological claims I want to make here: the
introduction of a level of abstraction is seen as a way of clarifying and
distilling what, in some cases, has become a complex domain or, in other
cases, exhibits similarities, parallels indicating the possibility of an under-
lying common framework. The previous disjunction is clearly not exclusive.
The new abstract level not only simplifies the situation but it also yields
a better control and understanding of the concepts involved. As Herstein
puts it: it reveals the proper setting for the solution of various problems.
The axiomatic method is a part of that process. Axiomatization should be
seen, in this light, as a form of design. Axioms capture either a common
structure or common properties leading to a better control and understand-
ing of the features at work. The axiomatic method is thus used as a sieve, a
filter in these processes. It brings to the fore the Archimedean points upon
which solutions to given problems work. What was previously immersed
in a mountain of irrelevant details is unearthed and shown to constitute
the mechanisms making concepts work together. This is precisely why we
feel justified in speaking of abstraction. As I have said, the process leads
to new mathematics, conceptually systematic and organized according to
clear principles. I claim that this way of using the axiomatic method has
evolved in contemporary mathematics to become a standard method.
As any contemporary mathematician knows too well, to work abstractly
is to work with mathematical entities in a certain manner. This was already
clear to Weber:
We can ... combine all isomorphic groups into a single class
of groups that is itself a group whose elements are the generic
concepts obtained by making one general concept out of the cor-
responding elements of the individual isomorphic groups. The
individual isomorphic groups are then to be regarded as different
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representatives of the generic concept, and it makes no difference
which representative is used to study the properties of the group.
Weber in 1893, quoted in (Wussing, 1984, 248)
It should be said, however, that in some cases, one wants to keep track
of specific isomorphisms between groups and they are just as significant as
the groups themselves. Weber is nonetheless expressing an extraordinarily
modern point of view in 1893.
It is tempting to reduce abstraction to a particular case of generalization.
Generalization is usually assumed to be a clear and simple process: it is
purely logical and consists in inferring a universally quantified proposition
∀xP (x) from a list of particulars having a property P (a), P (b), . . . , P (n).
Let me immediately emphasize the fact that this simply does not cover
all cases of generalizations that occur in mathematics. A simple example
is provided by the concept of integral and its various generalizations in
the last half of the 19th century (see Villeneuve, 2008, for details). For
one thing, an integral is an operation and it is not propositions about the
integral that were generalized but the operation itself. This is but one ex-
ample. At the conceptual level, it is the relationships between abstraction
and generalization that have to be clarified. It certainly seems possible to
generalize without abstracting. Think of various theorems that are gener-
alized although without leading to more abstract results. For instance, the
passage from the definition of continuity of a function f : R→ R at a point
to the notion of continuity over an interval [a, b] ⊂ R is a simple general-
ization that is certainly not an abstraction. The same could be said for the
generalization of theorems of real analysis to theorems of complex analysis.
Abstraction seems to always involve a form of generalization.
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